That is not quite the same as denying the existence of the subjective though, is it?Jim B. wrote:Yes. Dennett for one is doing that. He thinks that if you can't reduce the subjective to the objective, then you haven't really explained it. The assumption seems to be that consciousness must fit the standard pattern of scientific reduction.The Pixie wrote:That does seem a non-solution. Is anyone doing that?met wrote:Well, at least it takes all the phenomena into account; not denying the existence of the subjective, the first-person frame altogether to make the problem seem "solvable? "
That seems a non-solution....
I came across this interesting page about Dennett's position; I think it makes a lot of sense.
https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/publ ... au-debate/
Not sure what you are saying here. To explain liquidity you have to look at the movement of molecules and the intermolecular forces that are in the liquid, and compare them to solids and gases, so yes, you appeal to things that are not liquids, but I suspect that is not what you mean.So to sceintifically explain liquidity, you have to appeal to things that are not liquid. You can;t just say things are liquid because they participate in the property of 'the moist.' You have to discharge that property onto things that don;t exhibit that property. Otherwise you're just mystifying wetness.
This seems to be like objecting to the definition of a word using other different words. Any useful definition of a word will necessarily be made up of different words. Similarly I cannot imagine how something can be explained without reference to other things.Similarly, the assumption is that to explain consciousness, you have to appeal to non-conscious things. The whole point of a reductionist approach to consciousness is to fully account for it in terms of third person (objective) truths.