Just because something is not explainable by the natural sciences doesn't mean that thing would be 'supernatural.' There are good reasons to believe that the natural extends beyond what is physical to include things like consciousness, norms, values, meaning. Don't you remember all the times we've discussed this? Maybe I wasn't clear enough.The Pixie wrote: Your first comment (outside of quotes) on this thread was:
"For true justification, you need something beyond efficient causation, the purview of the natural sciences."
I took that to mean you were proposing something outside the natural world, i.e., the supernatural, and given the background here, a soul, a spirit or god seemed more than likely. Here we are on page five, and now it turns out I have no idea what you are claiming.
I form the belief because I already acknowledge the persuasiveness of the rule, not the other way. My beliefs and the rules I follow can be wrong, as far as accuracy, practicality or morality. Causes cannot be 'wrong'. They operate at a different level.A combination of factors (prior causes) contributed to giving the dollar, one of which was your prior belief that "one should help the needy whenever possible". How you can claim that belief did not precede the decision I cannot imagine. Clearly you already held the belief when the action was initiated, and clearly if you did not hold that belief at that point you would not have handed over the dollar.
The prior belief was, in part, the cause of the action.
The normative force of the rule to help the needy doesn't begin to exist the moment I believe in it. It doesn't 'exist' in the same way as causes exist and so it doesn't exert causal power the same way either. If it's right to help the needy, that rightness is not datable. We can't say "It was right to do so beginning on this date and ending on that date," as we can with causes. Causes operate temporally. Reasons don't seem to.
Maybe. The reasonableness of the purpose, tied in with earning a living, supporting loved ones etc and reasons supporting those doesn't precede its effects in the same way as causes do. It's the persuasiveness of the reasons I act on that are why I act, not because of beliefs or events in my brain that are popping like combustions of air and gas that drive pistons.Purposes are (or give) reasons and of course they do precede effects. If you did not have the purpose of getting to work, why did you get in your car? The purpose may be a goal to be achieved in the future, but the purpose has to come first so you can act on it towards achieving that goal.
I thought you were arguing that reasons are causes or at least a kind of cause. If not, what are we arguing about?No one is arguing that "reason" and "cause" are synonyms.
Reasons can be realized in multiple, and in many cases, an infinite variety of ways, unlike causes. One billiard ball cannot cause another one to move in precisely the same fashion in an infinite number of ways. If the reason for moving my body is to communicate that the captive dies, i could point my thumb downward, touch my nose, speak in code, smile, look at the sky, or do nothing at all etc. Conversely, touching my nose can mean an infinite number of things, ie it can be any number of different actions. In the first case, one action can be realized by an infinite number of bodily movements. In the second, one movement can be an infinite number of actions.Okay. So?
Yes, I do. But I think that conscious final causation can only occur in some conscious beings, humans and a few other species.The question here is: Do you hold to final causation in the sense Aristotle does?
If not, there is no point discussing what Aristotle said.
Yes, as I see it. I'm no differnt from a complex machine in that case. "I" am merely the locus in which causes discharge themselves.Why? We just agreed it was you doing the weighting and valuation. Does that weighting and valuation suddenly become meaningless if it is based on your prior state; your memories to that point, your genetic make up, your circumstances?
That's a very good point. I'm not saying it happens randomly. i'm saying it happens due to reasons,but that the reasons don't compel my decision. If i try to persuade you to go to law school rather than med school, the reasons i give you don't necessarily cause your decision even if they influence it. Otherwise there'd be no difference in kind between my placing a chip in your brain that would compel you to go to law school and my trying to persuade you.I think, on the contrary, that weighting and valuation would be meaningless if it was not based on those things, but was arbitrary or random.