What does "apophatic" mean?

[met]

Nevertheless, what Jim said on the other thread was that if you can't say anything about God apophatically, wouldn't that make Dawkins the most apophatic of theologians? - i.e. radical apophatism and atheism look about the same.

[Jim B.]

Do you really think this is worth the effort with Pixie?

There is an issue here about people saying things that are not true. Maybe the issue is with making a mistake, but being unable to admit it to the "evil atheist"; I have certainly seen that before on other fora. I think it is now clear that you did not indicate that you have doubts about whether there is a God in your thread about apothatic vs cataphatic, despite your claim. I thought it would a good idea to at least poll opinion on what the word means, because I accept it is not a word I was familiar with, but my reading on it did not agree with what you were claiming. Nothing on this thread suggests it is calling into question the existence of god, only that that existence could be incomprehensible.

Your reflex "dishonesty" charge whenever you don't understand something is getting really tiresome. Apophaticism involves not being able to say anything positive about God at all. God would not exist in a positive, unequivocal way according to apophaticism. We can say God exists but only analogically, somewhat in the same way we talk about sun rises. Maybe you should try to reflect on your own reflexive impulse to assume the "evil theist" who is always trying to get one over on you. I've never had this kind of problem with any atheist ever, either online or in person!

[Jim B.]

Nevertheless, what Jim said on the other thread was that if you can't say anything about God apophatically, wouldn't that make Dawkins the most apophatic of theologians? - i.e. radical apophatism and atheism look about the same.

Well, I was being provocative there. I think Dawkins is too dogmatic, too cataphatic in his atheism to ever qualify as an apophatic theist. Maybe a true "apatheist" would be a better candidate for the most apophatic theist.

[met]

I linked Px somewhere to Richard Peck's articles on "demonic" forces - "powers and principalities" - as Peck suggests those are (for Paul) always expressed in political terms, and linked to secular political and historical forces. Whether "demons" exist or not, in this view, they do "INSIST," existing as virtual entities, IOW, within the various the cultural, state, & institutional norms, mores, and expectations that we are all always forced to "serve."


This is related, of course, to Caputo's concept of "The Insistence of God" - http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent. ... =consensus - and to other radical "death-of-God type theologies, as well as to Apophatism.

But what's REALLY interesting (to me) is that this concept is essentially what the science is now saying about US, too: we ourselves are virtual entities. Our "existence" as rational, independent, coherent "selves" ( ie as Cartisian-"I's separate from the environment and capable of independent judgement) has become more and more empirically dubious - even tho it's certain we INSIST, ie that we have plenty of impact on things...

Wdyt? How does this all add up - if at all?

[met]

Nevertheless, what Jim said on the other thread was that if you can't say anything about God apophatically, wouldn't that make Dawkins the most apophatic of theologians? - i.e. radical apophatism and atheism look about the same.

Well, I was being provocative there. I think Dawkins is too dogmatic, too cataphatic in his atheism to ever qualify as an apophatic theist. Maybe a true "apatheist" would be a better candidate for the most apophatic theist.

Yeah, Dawkins is more the kind of atheist - like Px too, I suspect - who wants to keep that "center" that "God" used to represent and put "Reason & Science" there in a sort of Enlightenment way? Almost like the "Institution of Science" should be put up in the place that the RCC held in the Middle Ages?

Perhaps Nietchze was the first atheist thinker to realize that wouldn't work? That without "God", there was no "rational man" either, and reality and society now had to be understood in new terms .... Ie in terms of pure, amoral energies, or a "Will to Power?" ...( or somethin like that, I'm no Nietchze expert) ...

[Jim B.]

I linked Px somewhere to Richard Peck's articles on "demonic" forces - "powers and principalities" - as Peck suggests those are (for Paul) always expressed in political terms, and linked to secular political and historical forces. Whether "demons" exist or not, in this view, they do "INSIST," existing as virtual entities, IOW, within the various the cultural, state, & institutional norms, mores, and expectations that we are all always forced to "serve."


This is related, of course, to Caputo's concept of "The Insistence of God" - http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent. ... =consensus - and to other radical "death-of-God type theologies, as well as to Apophatism.

But what's REALLY interesting (to me) is that this concept is essentially what the science is now saying about US, too: we ourselves are virtual entities. Our "existence" as rational, independent, coherent "selves" ( ie as Cartisian-"I's separate from the environment and capable of independent judgement) has become more and more empirically dubious - even tho it's certain we INSIST, ie that we have plenty of impact on things...

Wdyt? How does this all add up - if at all?

Caputo sounds interesting. I like the turn towards poetics and away from metaphysics, even tho his position sounds like it puts way too much empahsis on us, our responsibility for God. No ground of being for Caputo?

When you say the empirical findings, you mean the neuro-scientific findings?

[met]

Well, loosely like Mag's bundled self concept? - or an emergent self one? - supported in different ways by a lot of psychology, cognitive science, and other stuff, not just by the neuroscience....

Caputo sounds interesting. I like the turn towards poetics and away from metaphysics, even tho his position sounds like it puts way too much empahsis on us, our responsibility for God. No ground of being for Caputo?

I think, for that crowd, even "ground of being" might be too centering; they might prefer "un-ground of being".

[Jim B.]

Well, loosely like Mag's bundled self concept? - or an emergent self one? - supported in different ways by a lot of psychology, cognitive science, and other stuff, not just by the neuroscience....

This goes back to the "Self" threads, Baggini vs. Swinburne, et al. I'm dubious of empirical research being given definitive say on questions like this, including 'free will' etc. before we know exactly what questions are being asked that the data is allegedly answering. There's the danger here of falling under the dreaded "illusion of technique." There's the psychological description of the self that's probably bundled and composite, but that may not be the most interesting question.

I think, for that crowd, even "ground of being" might be too centering; they might prefer "un-ground of being".

Berdyaev talks about freedom as the nothing out of which "God" emerges. Is that kind of the idea, the 'ground' of God as ungrounding?

[met]

Well, loosely like Mag's bundled self concept? - or an emergent self one? - supported in different ways by a lot of psychology, cognitive science, and other stuff, not just by the neuroscience....

This goes back to the "Self" threads, Baggini vs. Swinburne, et al. I'm dubious of empirical research being given definitive say on questions like this, including 'free will' etc. before we know exactly what questions are being asked that the data is allegedly answering. There's the danger here of falling under the dreaded "illusion of technique." There's the psychological description of the self that's probably bundled and composite, but that may not be the most interesting question.

I think, for that crowd, even "ground of being" might be too centering; they might prefer "un-ground of being".

Berdyaev talks about freedom as the nothing out of which "God" emerges. Is that kind of the idea, the 'ground' of God as ungrounding?

Wouldn't that be an idea that puts emphasis on the individual too? (I suspect every kind of immanence does...)

I dunno, this stuff is complex.... Um, someone make that say, "it is and it isn't!" ... Here's MJR's article comparing and contrasting Derridan 'difference' with Dionysian apophatism, and it's pretty dense at only about 18 pages.... But it does shed some light on gut on the "Pomo turn in theology" and on Caputo, who was a pal of Derrida's & is quite Derridian, too.

http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/view ... iv1facpubs

Différance, in other words, sounds the death-knell of the ontotheological God, who nevertheless haunts its every move. This is the reason deconstruction has nothing to do with negative theology, and everything to do with negative theology.

Sympathetic readers of Dionysius—myself included—have been inclined to argue that the Dionysian thearchy bears very little resemblance to Derrida’s dead tyrant; that is, to the ontotheological moral guarantor, summum ens, causa sui, or “transcendental signified” installed as a regulative punctum beyond the play of differences. For while it is undoubtedly the case that Dionysius calls God “being,” a “supra-essential subsistence,” and “totally undifferentiated,” it is also the case that he unsays all of these attributes.

[Jim B.]

Wouldn't that be an idea that puts emphasis on the individual too? (I suspect every kind of immanence does...)

Not sure I follow what you mean here, met. Do you mean the idea about the self or the unground? I can see how Swinburne's idea of the self puts emphasis on the individual.

I dunno, this stuff is complex.... Um, someone make that say, "it is and it isn't!" ... Here's MJR's article comparing and contrasting Derridan 'difference' with Dionysian apophatism, and it's pretty dense at only about 18 pages.... But it does shed some light on gut on the "Pomo turn in theology" and on Caputo, who was a pal of Derrida's & is quite Derridian, too.

http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/view ... iv1facpubs

Différance, in other words, sounds the death-knell of the ontotheological God, who nevertheless haunts its every move. This is the reason deconstruction has nothing to do with negative theology, and everything to do with negative theology.

Sympathetic readers of Dionysius—myself included—have been inclined to argue that the Dionysian thearchy bears very little resemblance to Derrida’s dead tyrant; that is, to the ontotheological moral guarantor, summum ens, causa sui, or “transcendental signified” installed as a regulative punctum beyond the play of differences. For while it is undoubtedly the case that Dionysius calls God “being,” a “supra-essential subsistence,” and “totally undifferentiated,” it is also the case that he unsays all of these attributes.

I'm working my way through the MJR chapter. Fascinating stuff! One question that came up for me: How is language possible in light of la differance? Doesn't the fact that I can formulate that concept suggest that something else might be in play? This may be way off base, but I was wondering if Berdyaev's idea of freedom could be thought of as a rough equivalent to la diff? A centrifugal 'nothing' that must be offset by a countervailing centripetal 'something' (in the apophatic sense) some would call "being" others would call "God"?