God and smallpox

[Jim B.]

You have not answered my questions at all here. I still do not understand what it means in a practical sense to say that love is your overarching meta-principle. Frankly, I am now wondering if you do.

It has to do with what God's purpose is. Love, creating beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good, that is his purpose. It's teleological. If you're asking what difference it makes practically in the world that this is his purpose, as opposed to quantum fluctuations being the cause of the world, that's not the question. Theodicies only attempt to reconcile the way the world actually is with an omni-God.

By a remarkable coincidence, my universe-creating quantum fluctuation does just that too. If it comes to that, so does the chair I am sat. My chair allows for people to love, and it also allows for suffering. Can I therefore claim that my chair has love as its overarching meta-principle?

Except that quantum fluctuations are not teleological by nature. They don't allow for anything as far as purpose.

My cat might be tortured by a sadistic neighbor who causes him the same exact amount of suffering as I do attempting to make him well. If he dies under each scenario with the same exact amount of suffering, what does my love for him mean in a practical sense? If we just look at outcomes, nothing. Looking just at outcomes is inadequate for moral evaluation.

Again, I am left wondering if you know what you mean by God having love as his overarching meta-principle.

Tell me what you don't follow, and I'll try again.

As far as I can tell, you have only given reasons for something that looks similar to a casual glance. What I have presented here is necessarily true by the law of the exclude middle. You have argued against something that is not that.

You're not allowing for the possibility of equivocation.

1.Causing my cat to suffer is for his greater good.
2.Causing my cat to suffer is not for his greater good.

Is this a violation of the law of excluded middle?

Causing my cat to suffer for R1 reasons does not logically contradict causing my cat to suffer for R2 reasons.

To understand proposition A, we have to know all that A means and all that A entails.

Socrates may be both mortal and not mortal, depending on how 'mortal' is defined. This does not violate the law of excluded middle but shows that the way it's applied depends on our knowledge base.

Okay, so I will rephrase it somewhat.

For each a, there is an E(a), how evil it is, which is simply its negative impact on the greater good. Your argument would seem to be that the sum of E(a) is actually less than zero, i.e., eliminating all bad things would overall be a nett increase in evil. Let us suppose that is true. All God need to is eliminate each individual a, where E(a) > 0.

No, the argument isn't that eliminating all bad things would overall be a net increase in evil. It's that eliminating all bad things is logically impossible. Promoting the greatest good carries the necessary cost of some evils, ie suffering. Maximizing good cannot entail eliminating the possibility of suffering.

I think the above addresses this. I appreciate God may not know, but is that a moral excuse? Can I say that I did not know all the implications to saving a drowning man - afterall, he might go on to steal some bread - and so not lift a finger to rescue him?

My point was that God's inability to draw the line other than valuationally does not argue against his omnisicience. If God has to respect an intact, integral world, that would be the default state. It wouldn't make sense then to ask why the default state holds. We can ask why there is a deviation from that state, but as I've said, it's logically possible that God has constraints on his actions that humans do not have. To ask for more details than that would be like asking for a detailed explanation of how I act.

If I am under different kinds of constraints than God, then of course I can and should save the drowning child and would be culpable for not doing so. Mankind eradicating smallpox was for the greater good as far as human actions. Mankind is not responsible for creating and maintaining an intact, integral world, among many other differences.

Do you think it possible he eliminates some evils? If so, you have the same problem you are trying to give me. Where does God draw the line?

Yes, I think it's possible. It's also possible that God could have reasons that no human mind can grasp just as I can have reasons for acting that no dog can grasp. But to say that some explanation cannot be filled in in detail doesn't mean it can't be understood in principle. My actions can't be understood in detail but can be understood in principle.

And how do we know he doesn't? If God had prevented the emergence of smallpox, that would not have weighed at all for you against your argument because you could point to evil 2.....to evil n, etc. Any evil at all which is present and knowable and which humans can improve or eliminate would carry the same weight in principle.

Yes, it very much would.

So you are arguing against an omni-God because there is any evil at all that humans can eliminate? That there is a world like this one at all? You're arguing for a counterfactual world that may not be logically coherent.

[met]

Okay, so I will rephrase it somewhat.

For each a, there is an E(a), how evil it is, which is simply its negative impact on the greater good. Your argument would seem to be that the sum of E(a) is actually less than zero, i.e., eliminating all bad things would overall be a nett increase in evil. Let us suppose that is true. All God need to is eliminate each individual a, where E(a) > 0.

No, the argument isn't that eliminating all bad things would overall be a net increase in evil. It's that eliminating all bad things is logically impossible. Promoting the greatest good carries the necessary cost of some evils, ie suffering. Maximizing good cannot entail eliminating the possibility of suffering.

This is what I saw and wondered if there was sufficient underlying commonality even for debate: Px's view seems to suggest either that (1) all "bad things" could be eliminated without affecting the scope of human freedom, which is what you suggest might not be the ontological case, OR (2) that if human freedom is a "cause" of suffering--that it inevitably leads to suffering or at least the potential for that--then freedom could and should be eliminated, suggesting in his estimate, freedom or spontaneity have no value, or at least not as much value (for us) as an absence of pain or of loss. But which view does he take? The second view is not really compatible with the essence of your points, and I'm not even sure the difference is debatable.

Has he made this distinction clear anywhere?

And how do we know he doesn't? If God had prevented the emergence of smallpox, that would not have weighed at all for you against your argument because you could point to evil 2.....to evil n, etc. Any evil at all which is present and knowable and which humans can improve or eliminate would carry the same weight in principle.

The thing about an omni-God is he is responsible for EVERYTHING! To make the type of PoE argument you`re making, you have to function within theistic assumptions, and not just jump out to atheistic POV wherever it suits you. So, obviously, you can't claim humans "did" anything, good, bad, or indifferent (within that kind of theistic worldview) without acknowledging at least God's "consenting will." So, if a potential cure for smallpox even existed, that counts in God's favor, and there's a sense in which 'God did that too' ... even if it was thru his or her human agents.

[The Pixie]

It has to do with what God's purpose is. Love, creating beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good, that is his purpose. It's teleological. If you're asking what difference it makes practically in the world that this is his purpose, as opposed to quantum fluctuations being the cause of the world, that's not the question. Theodicies only attempt to reconcile the way the world actually is with an omni-God.

The question is, now that God has created mankind, what does he do? His entire purpose is done now, from what you say here. He has created beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good. Does he put his feet up, after a good job done?

The point about the hypothetical quantum fluctuation is that once it has engendered the universe, it too does nothing more. Once mankind is created, the soulless quantum fluctuation does just the same as the love of God. I.e., nothing at all.

Remember, this overarching meta-principle is supposed to justify God breaking the rule he invented for himself of not intervening. If you read the Bible, those occasions when God did intervene after the first couple of chapters, it was not to creating beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good.

Does he have some other agenda?

Except that quantum fluctuations are not teleological by nature. They don't allow for anything as far as purpose.

That is right. The purposeless quantum fluctuation that hypothetically engendered the universe and so mankind has created beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good.

Of course, you may object that the quantum fluctuation does not love, but according to your use of the word here, it does, just by virtue of creating a species capable of love. And by assuming it loves, of course, but you do that for God too.

My cat might be tortured by a sadistic neighbor who causes him the same exact amount of suffering as I do attempting to make him well. If he dies under each scenario with the same exact amount of suffering, what does my love for him mean in a practical sense? If we just look at outcomes, nothing. Looking just at outcomes is inadequate for moral evaluation.

The point surely is the expected outcome. You cause the suffering in the expectation that the cat will benefit in the long term.

Previous we had an action, a, and the evil of the act, the negative impact on the greater good, E(a). What we really need to consider is E'(a), the perceived evil of the act. For what you did to the cat, E'(a) < 0, i.e., you expected your actions to have a positive effect; your action was morally right. Even if you were incorrect, and the cat ended up suffering more, you acted morally given what you knew at the time.

For the daist, of course, E'(a) > 0

Again, I am left wondering if you know what you mean by God having love as his overarching meta-principle.

Tell me what you don't follow, and I'll try again.

See above.

But here is a different approach. Take a few examples from the Bible that you believe actually happened, and show how God's intervention was morally right for him, given love as his overarching meta-principle. Then we can compare that with "Love, creating beings he loves and who are capable of internalizing through experience love of him and of the good, that is his purpose."

You're not allowing for the possibility of equivocation.

1.Causing my cat to suffer is for his greater good.
2.Causing my cat to suffer is not for his greater good.

Is this a violation of the law of excluded middle?

That is right. I am not allowing for the possibility of equivocation. I have stated it like this specifically to deny that possibility:

Allowing smallpox to flourish was, from God's perspective, and within the full, wider context for the greater good, or, from exactly the same perspective and in exactly the same context it was not.

1.Causing my cat to suffer is for his greater good.
2.Causing my cat to suffer is not for his greater good from exactly the same perspective and in exactly the same context

Is this a violation of the law of excluded middle?

Admittedly I did not state that explicitly last time, but that was because I had hoped we had moved on from that.

No, the argument isn't that eliminating all bad things would overall be a net increase in evil. It's that eliminating all bad things is logically impossible. Promoting the greatest good carries the necessary cost of some evils, ie suffering. Maximizing good cannot entail eliminating the possibility of suffering.

There is that false dichotomy again. Or is it a straw man perhaps?

I am not saying God should eliminate all bad things.

I am saying if God existed we would expect him to eliminate smallpox.

My point was that God's inability to draw the line other than valuationally does not argue against his omnisicience. If God has to respect an intact, integral world, that would be the default state. It wouldn't make sense then to ask why the default state holds. We can ask why there is a deviation from that state, but as I've said, it's logically possible that God has constraints on his actions that humans do not have. To ask for more details than that would be like asking for a detailed explanation of how I act.

We know God does not have to respect an intact, integral world because the Bible is clear that he has not.

If I am under different kinds of constraints than God, then of course I can and should save the drowning child and would be culpable for not doing so. Mankind eradicating smallpox was for the greater good as far as human actions. Mankind is not responsible for creating and maintaining an intact, integral world, among many other differences.

Wiping out a strain of bacteria before it got widespread would have far less effect on the integrity of the world than, for example, resurrecting someone. Somehow the integrity of the world survived when mankind wiped out smallpox.

Yes, I think it's possible. It's also possible that God could have reasons that no human mind can grasp just as I can have reasons for acting that no dog can grasp. But to say that some explanation cannot be filled in in detail doesn't mean it can't be understood in principle. My actions can't be understood in detail but can be understood in principle.

It is also possible we are living in a computer-generated virtual reality. Ultimately nothing is certain outside mathematics. We have to rely on what knowledge we have to draw inferences about the universe. So yes, it is possible that God has reasons mankind does not understand, just as it is possible that the chair you are sat on does not really exist.

So you are arguing against an omni-God because there is any evil at all that humans can eliminate? That there is a world like this one at all? You're arguing for a counterfactual world that may not be logically coherent.

I am arguing for a world without smallpox. We know that that is logically coherent, because we are currently living in such a world.

[The Pixie]

This is what I saw and wondered if there was sufficient underlying commonality even for debate: Px's view seems to suggest either that (1) all "bad things" could be eliminated without affecting the scope of human freedom, which is what you suggest might not be the ontological case, OR (2) that if human freedom is a "cause" of suffering--that it inevitably leads to suffering or at least the potential for that--then freedom could and should be eliminated, suggesting in his estimate, freedom or spontaneity have no value, or at least not as much value (for us) as an absence of pain or of loss. But which view does he take? The second view is not really compatible with the essence of your points, and I'm not even sure the difference is debatable.

I am not saying either of those.

I am saying some "bad things" could be eliminated without affecting the scope of human freedom, and that a moral God would choose to do that.

The thing about an omni-God is he is responsible for EVERYTHING! To make the type of PoE argument you`re making, you have to function within theistic assumptions, and not just jump out to atheistic POV wherever it suits you. So, obviously, you can't claim humans "did" anything, good, bad, or indifferent (within that kind of theistic worldview) without acknowledging at least God's "consenting will." So, if a potential cure for smallpox even existed, that counts in God's favor, and there's a sense in which 'God did that too' ... even if it was thru his or her human agents.

That still does not explain why God did not do it thousands of years earlier, and so greatly reduce human suffering.

Furthermore, this undermines Jim's argument that God has invented a rule for himself of not intervening.

[met]

I am saying some "bad things" could be eliminated without affecting the scope of human freedom, and that a moral God would choose to do that.

Platinga makes an argument that if God can create an infinite number of different worlds, then a "best possible"one - which seems to be what you want to insist on - isn't really possible. Then, you can only ask for a "good enough" world, since it could always be better.

Furthermore, this undermines Jim's argument that God has invented a rule for himself of not intervening.

Maybe, but creating a world in which a cure is possible, one where it EXISTS to be found in the first place, isn't intervening, which is what I was trying to suggest with the "get your own dirt" joke above too. Jim's scenario is slightly different, where God more or less "gives some of his power away" to create space for freedom. Think of the set of all integers except '3', - it's not any "smaller" (as infinite sets are measured) but it is different; eg, there are a whole bunch of new primes like '6', '9', etc.

[The Pixie]

Platinga makes an argument that if God can create an infinite number of different worlds, then a "best possible"one - which seems to be what you want to insist on - isn't really possible. Then, you can only ask for a "good enough" world, since it could always be better.

Is this in the sense that there is not a highest integer, since there will always be one that is 1 better? Would it be fair to conclude, then, that some of these worlds (an infinite number in fact) are better than heaven? Further, there must be worlds that are worse than the worst imaginable hell. Is that fair comment?

Maybe, but creating a world in which a cure is possible, one where it EXISTS to be found in the first place, isn't intervening, which is what I was trying to suggest with the "get your own dirt" joke above too. Jim's scenario is slightly different, where God more or less "gives some of his power away" to create space for freedom. Think of the set of all integers except '3', - it's not any "smaller" (as infinite sets are measured) but it is different; eg, there are a whole bunch of new primes like '6', '9', etc.

But then your all-powerful, all-good, all-loving God is behaving no differently to the hypothetical quantum fluctuation that engendered the universe. Both just sit by and let the universe unfold as it will.