is evil essential or realist?

[Metacrock]

Yahweh (and derivatives) is what I have in mind.

Why would that be "the" conception of God?

It's the one that's faced the most critical inquiry and defense

.

I don't think we can say which that is. the ts argument proves the concept of God it's self is a priori.

[Jim B.]

Yahweh (and derivatives) is what I have in mind.

Why would that be "the" conception of God?

It's the one that's faced the most critical inquiry and defense. It's the one that's relevant on this board, I think. If you want to ask, "is there some vaguely defined perhaps even yet-to-be-conceived entity to which we might apply the label God", I think the proper response to that is ignosticism. I don't think ignosticism necessarily applies to Yahweh-and-derivatives because He's usually sufficiently well defined to discuss - though there can be an awful lot of backpedaling and evasiveness.

(note that when I refer to ignosticism, I just mean the stance that "there's nothing to talk about here" and not anything more specific)

How do you figure it's the one relevant on this board? The conception(s) of God discussed on this board don't really resemble Yaweh & derivatives, unless you define 'derivatives' so broadly that the definition risks becoming trivial. Obviously some conditions have to be met in order to fix the reference of the concept, if the concept were instantiated, but that doesn't mean it has to be all that well-defined beyond that in order to be something worth discussing and believing in. What one believes that people should be ignostic about has a whole lot to do with one's assumptions going in, I think.

[Magritte]

I don't think we can say which that is. the ts argument proves the concept of God it's self is a priori.

In some of your arguments you pound God flat, into a very thin concept like the "ts" or "eternal necessary being", in order to slide it under the door. The problem is, once it has passed under the door you have to derive your fuller concept of God from that reduced conception - and it doesn't follow that your fuller conception automatically proceeds from the reduced, thin conception.

[Magritte]

How do you figure it's the one relevant on this board? The conception(s) of God discussed on this board don't really resemble Yaweh & derivatives, unless you define 'derivatives' so broadly that the definition risks becoming trivial.

If most of the posters here are Christians, and Metacrock certainly is, then the God they're referring to is supposed to be revealed in the Bible. That's the God of Abraham and Moses, the God who is the heavenly father of Jesus. Granted, the conception has evolved over time, but when I say "Yahweh" I'm referring to the family tree of conceptions by the root, not necessarily saying that all believers are somehow obliged to believe strictly in an early (I don't want to say more primitive) conception of Yahweh as the Judeo-Christian monotheistic deity.

Obviously some conditions have to be met in order to fix the reference of the concept, if the concept were instantiated, but that doesn't mean it has to be all that well-defined beyond that in order to be something worth discussing and believing in. What one believes that people should be ignostic about has a whole lot to do with one's assumptions going in, I think.

If you have a conception that you want argue is instantiated, I think you bear the burden of showing that most if not all of its supposed properties are instantiated. You can't argue for the general and assume the specific. Showing that life exists on some planet doesn't show that mammals exist there, or that cats exist there, or that long haired black cats with green eyes exist there. The vaguest, slipperiest conceptions are sometimes the easiest to defend, though.

[Magritte]

Hm, I may be coming across as unnecessarily strict - what I'm getting at is, what is the minimal set of attributes required for some entity to earn the title "God" in the broadest Christian sense?

I'd say at least being "not less than personal", as Meta quotes Tillich, is one requirement. A completely non-personal God is a non starter. Also, this God would have to have some caring and concern for humans, and would have to have deliberately designed humans, and would intercede in human history at times, and perhaps respond to prayer. What else counts as a minimal requirement?

edit: personal also implies mental - or "not less than mental" - not less than conscious? Anyhow, to be God, it can't be an automaton or something analogous to a natural process, a "dumb" thing that just happens. It can't be an unaware consciousness-less "theistic zombie" - sort of like Chalmers' philosophical zombie.

[Jim B.]

If most of the posters here are Christians, and Metacrock certainly is, then the God they're referring to is supposed to be revealed in the Bible. That's the God of Abraham and Moses, the God who is the heavenly father of Jesus. Granted, the conception has evolved over time, but when I say "Yahweh" I'm referring to the family tree of conceptions by the root, not necessarily saying that all believers are somehow obliged to believe strictly in an early (I don't want to say more primitive) conception of Yahweh as the Judeo-Christian monotheistic deity.

I think I understand. Would you say that Meta's conception of God is a derivative of Yahweh? I tend to think of Yahweh as the mythological medium and that later people can winnow out, to various degrees, the "message" from the medium.

If you have a conception that you want argue is instantiated, I think you bear the burden of showing that most if not all of its supposed properties are instantiated. You can't argue for the general and assume the specific. Showing that life exists on some planet doesn't show that mammals exist there, or that cats exist there, or that long haired black cats with green eyes exist there. The vaguest, slipperiest conceptions are sometimes the easiest to defend, though.

I think it's enough to argue for a rational warrant for God as a general concept. I think that's as far as argumentation can go. The rest depends upon personal experience. I can, however, argue for the existence of a black and white long-haired cat with green eyes here in my lap.

[Jim B.]

Hm, I may be coming across as unnecessarily strict - what I'm getting at is, what is the minimal set of attributes required for some entity to earn the title "God" in the broadest Christian sense?

I'd say at least being "not less than personal", as Meta quotes Tillich, is one requirement. A completely non-personal God is a non starter. Also, this God would have to have some caring and concern for humans, and would have to have deliberately designed humans, and would intercede in human history at times, and perhaps respond to prayer. What else counts as a minimal requirement?

edit: personal also implies mental - or "not less than mental" - not less than conscious? Anyhow, to be God, it can't be an automaton or something analogous to a natural process, a "dumb" thing that just happens. It can't be an unaware consciousness-less "theistic zombie" - sort of like Chalmers' philosophical zombie.

I tend to think that argumentation, at most, can establish a rational warrant for a "thinner" conception of God. Thicker conceptions are carried through the thicker medium of personal experience rather than abstract thought. Maybe that's why the revelation of God's solidarity with humanity had to be told through the medium of narrative, since narrative has to be experienced and loses something in having its message abstracted and synopsized.

I agree that we're left with the "not less than's" in discussing God's anthropormorphic attributes. But again, I think these attributes can only be 'argued' for, if at all, in terms of "What's the most intellectually satisfying response to all of our encounter with reality, in all its dimensions?"
God didn't necessarily deliberately design humans. You can think of it as his endowing the universe with the potentiality for rational order and self-awareness.

[met]

Jim, your allusion to a process theism-like God who cannot arbitrarily achieve his/her will makes me want to ask an interesting and little-addressed question: rather than how much can a necessary being lack consciousness and/or benevolence, could we wonder how much the outcome of the universe can be at stake and there still be a "God"? Iow, how much power could an all-knowing & benevolent being lack before we had to stop referring to him/her as "God"?

Does that make any sense? ....

[Magritte]

I think I understand. Would you say that Meta's conception of God is a derivative of Yahweh? I tend to think of Yahweh as the mythological medium and that later people can winnow out, to various degrees, the "message" from the medium.

Well yeah, like I say, the conception of God has evolved but there's at least some connection to the God of the OT, or else you'd have to say that nothing about God is revealed in the OT which has knock-on effects for Jesus, no? I'm not saying that all the OT baggage is necessarily dragged along.

Similarities between Yahweh and Meta's conception are, like I stated above, that it's not less than personal and not less than mental - that it's something that it's possible to have a relationship with, that this is a God who emerges into history and interacts with humanity.

I think it's enough to argue for a rational warrant for God as a general concept.

I don't think these kinds of arguments establish a not-less-than-conscious, not-less-than-personal, caring entity, so I don't think they establish a general God-concept at all, as I understand the term God and as I understand almost all judeo-christian theists use it.

I think that's as far as argumentation can go. The rest depends upon personal experience. I can, however, argue for the existence of a black and white long-haired cat with green eyes here in my lap.

I also affirm the existence of Cat based on personal experience, bless His or Her whiskers.

[Magritte]

I agree that we're left with the "not less than's" in discussing God's anthropormorphic attributes. But again, I think these attributes can only be 'argued' for, if at all, in terms of "What's the most intellectually satisfying response to all of our encounter with reality, in all its dimensions?"

IMHO what you get there is not intellectual satisfaction in the sense of answered questions, but affective satisfaction in the sense of closure. The difference is - well, here's an analogy. Take the problem of consciousness. We don't know how conscious awareness emerges (assuming it does emerge) so some folks take the position that the question is unanswerable and consciousness just is. That may be closure, and it may be satisfying in some way to put the question to bed, but is it really intellectually satisfying?

God didn't necessarily deliberately design humans. You can think of it as his endowing the universe with the potentiality for rational order and self-awareness.

OK, but there, you still have consciousness and intent - agency - and the possibility of relation to whatever rational and self aware beings happen to turn up. So God still isn't a mere principle or property, like the TS or the ground of being.